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Abstract
We investigate a new class of congestion games, called Totally Unimodular (TU) Congestion
Games, where the players’ strategies are binary vectors inside polyhedra defined by totally
unimodular constraint matrices. Network congestion games belong to this class.
In the symmetric case, when all players have the same strategy set, we design an algo-
rithm that finds an optimal aggregated strategy and then decomposes it into the single players’
strategies. This approach yields strongly polynomial-time algorithms to (i) find a pure Nash
equilibrium, and (ii) compute a socially optimal state, if the delay functions are weakly convex.
We also show how this technique can be extended to matroid congestion games.
We introduce some combinatorial TU congestion games, where the players’ strategies are
matchings, vertex covers, edge covers, and stable sets of a given bipartite graph. In the asym-
metric case, we show that for these games (i) it is PLS-complete to find a pure Nash equilibrium
even in case of linear delay functions, and (ii) it is NP-hard to compute a socially optimal state,
even in case of weakly convex delay functions.
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1 Introduction
A central problem of Algorithmic Game Theory concerns the existence of Nash equilibria and the
design of polynomial-time algorithms for their computation. Nash equilibria are a very powerful
and well-studied solution concept, and they have had tremendous impact in economics and social
sciences [11]. A mixed strategy is a probability distribution over the pure strategies of a player.
In his celebrated work [15, 16], John Nash proved the existence of mixed equilibria for any game
with a finite set of strategies. In some applications mixed Nash equilibria seems to have no natural
interpretation, and thus, pure Nash equilibria are sometimes a more suitable solution concept than
mixed Nash equilibria [27, 2]. Unfortunately, pure Nash equilibria are not guaranteed to exist, and
even if they do, they are often hard to compute.
On the positive side, there are classes of games that are known to posses pure Nash equilibria.
A prominent example are potential games, originally introduced by Monderer and Shapley [14].
The key property of potential games is the existence of a potential function, i.e. a function defined
on the joint strategy set of the players, and such that, if any player unilaterally deviates from
her strategy, the change in her payoff is equal to the change in the potential function. A pure
Nash equilibrium of a potential game can be found with a local search algorithm that minimizes
the potential function over the strategy set of the game, where each iteration of the algorithm
corresponds to an improving step of a player. Even if this algorithm is finite, it could take an
exponential number of iterations to reach a local optimum, that is, a pure Nash equilibrium.
Potential games are related to the complexity class Polynomial Local Search (PLS) introduced by
Johnson, Papadimitriou and Yannakakis [12, 21]. In fact, this class includes all problems with
a local search algorithm where each improving step can be performed in polynomial time. Many
families of potential games have been shown to be PLS-complete, suggesting that a polynomial-time
algorithm to find a pure Nash equilibrium is unlikely to exist for these games in general.
In this work, we focus on congestion games, a class of potential games that has been widely
investigated in the literature (see, e.g., [17, 19, 25, 7, 18, 4, 5]), and we provide new insight on their
computational complexity using a polyhedral approach. In a congestion game, a set of resources
is given, and each player selects a feasible subset of the resources in order to minimize her cost
function. The cost of a player’s strategy is the sum of the delays of the resources selected by the
player, and the delay of each resource is a function of the total number of players using it.
An example are network congestion games, where the resources are the arcs of a given digraph
D = (V,E) and the strategies of each player i are all (ri, si)-paths in D, for ri, si ∈ V . Fabrikant et
al. [7] gave an algorithm to find a pure Nash equilibrium in symmetric network congestion games,
i.e., when all players share the same origin-destination pair. The algorithm is based on a reduction
to minimum cost flow and runs in strongly polynomial time. In the asymmetric case, network
congestion games are PLS-complete, even in case of linear delay functions [7, 1].
Another class of symmetric congestion games for which a pure Nash equilibrium can be com-
puted in polynomial time are matroid congestion games, i.e. congestion games where the strategy
space of each player consists of the bases of a matroid over the set of resources. Ackermann et
al. [1] proved that for this class of games the best-response dynamics are polynomially bounded
in the number of players and resources, and that the matroid property is also necessary for guar-
anteeing polynomial time convergence of the best-response dynamics to a Nash equilibrium. The
work of Ackermann et al. initiates the investigation of structural properties of congestion games
that guarantee the polynomial time computability of a pure Nash equilibrium. Their focus is on
the convergence time for best responses, and on the local properties of the players’ strategy spaces.
In contrast with this approach, we propose to exploit the global structure of the game and to study
it from a polyhedral point of view.
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Polyhedral approach. We study congestion games where the players’ strategies are given im-
plicitly through a polyhedral representation. For a congestion game with N players and n re-
sources, let Xi = {χi ∈ {0, 1}n : χi is the incidence vector of a strategy of player i}, and let
P i = {xi ∈ [0, 1]n : Aixi ≥ bi} be a polyhedron such that P i = conv(Xi). The game is sym-
metric if Ai = A and bi = b for i = 1, . . . , N . Our main goal is to understand what properties of
P i affect the computational complexity of finding a pure Nash equilibrium. We investigate totally
unimodular (TU) congestion games, where Ai is a m×n totally unimodular (TU) matrix, i.e. each
square submatrix of Ai has determinant equal to 0, +1, or −1, and bi is integral, for all i. It is
easy to verify that network congestion games are of this form. However, TU congestion games
capture a larger array of congestion games. For example, consider a congestion game where the
agents (e.g. taxi drivers, call center operators) compete to supply their service to as many clients as
possible in a finite time horizon. Each time period is a resource that gets congested, since the profit
of each agent in that period (the number of clients that each agent can serve) decreases with the
total number of agents that are active. Moreover, agents are typically not allowed to work in more
than a certain number of consecutive time periods. For example, taxi drivers may be constrained
to work during at most a 8 hours time shift out of the 3 shifts available in a day, and at least 5
shifts per week. In this case, n = 3× 7 is the number of shifts in a week, and A is a binary matrix
with the consecutive-ones property, thus it is TU. It follows that this game can be modeled as a
symmetric TU congestion game.
Our results. Our main contribution is to give an algorithm that runs in time polynomial in
n,m and N , to find a pure Nash equilibrium of symmetric TU congestion games defined using a
TU matrix A ∈ Rm×n. Our algorithm is structured into two phases. In the first phase, we solve
an aggregated problem, where we minimize the potential function over the aggregated strategies
of the players, to determine how many players should use each resource. Here, monotonicity of
the delay functions and total unimodularity of the constraint matrix are crucial to reformulate
the aggregated problem as a linear program. In the second phase, we apply an algorithm that
decomposes the optimal aggregated strategy into the single players’ strategies. To this purpose,
we rely on the so-called integer decomposition property [3], holding for polyhedra defined by TU
constraint matrices.
The same approach can be used to compute in strongly polynomial time a socially optimal
state of a symmetric TU congestion game, if the delay functions are weakly convex. Moreover,
our two-phase algorithm can be applied also to (symmetric and asymmetric) matroid congestion
games, and one of the crucial reasons why this is possible is that the independent set polytope of a
matroid also has the integer decomposition property. We further extend our algorithm to compute
in strongly polynomial time a socially optimal state of a polymatroid congestion game, if the delay
functions are weakly convex.
Concerning asymmetric congestion games, even if all the P is share the same TU constraint
matrix A and differ only in the right-hand side vectors bi, i = 1, . . . , N , we can directly show PLS-
completeness of finding a pure Nash equilibrium and NP-hardness of finding a socially optimal
state, since asymmetric network congestion games can be cast in this setting. For a bipartite graph
G = (V,E) we introduce a number of combinatorial congestion games, where the strategies of each
player are defined on a subgraph Gi of G as: (i) matchings of Gi, (ii) edge covers of Gi, (iii) vertex
covers of Gi, (iv) stable sets of Gi. In the symmetric case, i.e., when Gi = G for i = 1, . . . , N , our
algorithm runs in time polynomial in |V |, |E|, and N , and has combinatorial interpretations. In
the asymmetric case, we show through a reduction from POS NAE 2SAT that all the above games
are PLS-complete even in case of linear profit/delay functions. Moreover, if the delay functions are
weakly convex, for all these combinatorial games it is NP-hard to compute a socially optimal state.
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2 Preliminaries
Let (X, f) be a game with N players, where Xi is the strategy set of player i, X = X1×· · ·×XN , f i :
X → R is the cost function of player i and f = (f1, . . . , fN ). We assume that, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , N},
Xi is a finite set, and we call each element x ∈ X a state of the game. A pure Nash equilibrium
is a state x = (x1, . . . , xN ) such that for each i, f i(x1, . . . , xi, . . . , xN ) ≤ f i(x1, . . . , x¯i, . . . , xN ) for
any x¯i ∈ Xi.
Congestion games. In a congestion game there is a finite set of resources R and, for each
i = 1, . . . , N , a set Xi ⊆ 2R. From now on we assume |R| = n and we identify each xi ∈ Xi with
its incidence vector in {0, 1}n. A nondecreasing delay function dj : {1, . . . , N} → Z is associated
with each resource j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. For a resource j ∈ {1, . . . , n} and a state x ∈ X, denote by tj(x)
the number of players using j in state x. The cost f i(x) incurred by player i in state x ∈ X, is
computed as the sum of the delays over all the resources selected by i, where the delay of resource
j is dj(tj(x)). Each player i, given the other players’ strategies x
−i, chooses a strategy xi ∈ Xi that
minimizes f i(xi, x−i). Note that we are not assuming the delays to be nonnegative. In particular,
if the delays are negative, by turning the minimization into maximization problems and changing
the signs, we obtain positive nonincreasing functions associated to the resources, to be interpreted
as profits. A congestion game is symmetric if all Xi’s are the same, i.e. all players have the same
strategy set.
In a classical paper [17], Rosenthal proved that any congestion game has a pure Nash equi-
librium. The proof is based on the fact that congestion games are a subclass of (exact) potential
games, and they admit the following potential function:
φ(x) =
n∑
j=1
tj(x)∑
i=1
dj(i). (1)
Since φ is an exact potential function, for any i = 1, . . . , N , x = (xi, x−i) ∈ X, x¯ = (x¯i, x−i) ∈ X,
we have that φ(x) − φ(x¯) = f i(x) − f i(x¯). Thus a pure Nash equilibrium is a state x ∈ X such
that, for each player i and x¯i ∈ Xi, φ(xi, x−i) ≤ φ(x¯i, x−i). As a consequence, a global optimum of
min{φ(x) : x ∈ X} is a pure Nash equilibrium of the congestion game.
Totally unimodular congestion games. In totally unimodular (TU) congestion games, the
sets Xi correspond to the vectors xi that satisfy:
Aixi ≥ bi (2)
xi ∈ {0, 1}n,
where bi ∈ Zm, and Ai ∈ {0,±1}m×n is a given TU matrix, as defined above and treated in detail
in [22]. A TU congestion game is symmetric if Ai = A and bi = b for every player i = 1, . . . , N .
The class of TU congestion games widely extends the class of network games studied by Fab-
rikant et al. [7]. Examples of TU matrices that are not incidence matrices of directed graphs include
incidence matrices of bipartite graphs, matrices with the consecutive-ones property, and network
matrices. A full characterization of TU matrices is given by Seymour [24]. Moreover, Seymour’s
algorithm can be used to recognize in polynomial time if a congestion game, where the strategy
sets are given via systems of inequalities, is a TU congestion game or not.
3 Symmetric TU congestion games
Nash equilibria. We first investigate the computational complexity of finding a pure Nash equi-
librium of a symmetric TU congestion game.
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Theorem 1. There is a strongly polynomial-time algorithm for finding a pure Nash equilibrium in
symmetric TU congestion games.
Proof. The algorithm computes a global optimum of
min{φ(x) : x ∈ X}, (3)
where φ is the potential function of the congestion game and X = X1 × · · · ×XN is the strategy
space. Since a global optimum of (3) is also a local optimum of the local search problem, the
resulting state is a pure Nash equilibrium.
In the first phase of our algorithm, we set up an aggregated problem as follows. Since the value
of the potential function (1) only depends on how many players use a resource, we sum up the
constraints corresponding to a given row of matrix A for all players, and we define the aggregated
variables z ∈ [0, N ]n ∩ Zn such that zj =
∑N
i=1 x
i
j for each resource j.
min

n∑
j=1
zj∑
i=1
dj(i) : Az ≥ Nb, z ∈ [0, N ]n ∩ Zn
 . (4)
In the remainder of the proof, we find an optimum z¯ of (4), and then we show how to decompose
it into a state x¯ ∈ X such that z¯ = x¯1 + · · · + x¯N , with x¯i ∈ Xi. Since, for each state x ∈ X, the
corresponding z = x1 + · · ·+ xN is feasible for (4) and has the same objective value, we have that
x¯ is an optimum of (3).
Next, to model the objective function of (4) as a linear function, we introduce variables yi ∈
{0, 1}n for i = 1, . . . , N , where yij = 1 if at least i players use resource j, and yij = 0 otherwise.
Since z = y1 + · · ·+ yN for each resource j, we can write our aggregated problem as:
minimize
n∑
j=1
N∑
i=1
dj(i)y
i
j (5)
subject to
N∑
i=1
Ayi ≥ Nb
0 ≤ yi ≤ 1 i = 1, . . . , N
yi ∈ {0, 1}n i = 1, . . . , N.
First, for each z feasible for (4), we define yij = 1 if i ≤ zj and yij = 0 otherwise. Note that y
is feasible for (5) and with the same objective value as z. Moreover, for each y feasible for (5),
the vector z = y1 + · · · + yN is feasible for (4) and has objective value not larger than that of y.
Therefore, the optimal solution y¯ of (5) yields an optimal solution z¯ of (4).
We now show how to solve problem (5). First, the constraint matrix of the aggregated problem
(5) is also TU, since it is of the form
( A A · · · A︸ ︷︷ ︸
N times
).
As the right hand side of the system is integral, the linear relaxation of the feasible set of the
aggregated problem has only integral vertices (see for example Theorem 19.3 in [22]). Thus we can
find an optimal solution y¯ of the aggregated problem via linear programming. Using Tardos’s [26]
algorithm, this can be done in time polynomial in size(A) and in N , thus in time polynomial in
n,m,N because all entries of A are in {0,±1}. The vector z¯ = y¯1 + . . . y¯N is then an optimum of
(4). In the remainder of the proof, we show how to derive from z¯ a state x¯ with the same objective
value in (3).
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Since Az¯ ≥ Nb, and 0 ≤ z¯j ≤ N for every j = 1, . . . , n, z¯ is an integral vector in N · P , where
P = {x : 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, Ax ≥ b}. Since A is TU, the polyhedron P has the integer decomposition
property, thus there exist integer vectors x¯1, . . . , x¯N in P such that z¯ = x¯1 + · · · + x¯N . Following
Baum and Trotter [3], we show how to obtain such vectors in strongly polynomial time.
We show how to find an integer vector x¯1 in P such that z¯− x¯1 is an integer vector in (N−1) ·P .
In order to do so, we define
P 1 = {s : 0 ≤ s ≤ 1, z¯ − (N − 1) ≤ s ≤ z¯, b ≤ As ≤ Az¯ − (N − 1)b}. (6)
The polyhedron P 1 is nonempty since it contains z¯/N , and is integral since its constraint matrix is
TU. Again using Tardos’s [26] algorithm, we can find a vertex x¯1 of P 1 in time polynomial in n,m.
By applying the above argument recursively N times, we obtain integral vectors x¯1, x¯2, . . . , x¯N
in P with z¯ = x¯1 + · · · + x¯N . Therefore, x¯ is a pure Nash equilibrium. The total running time of
the algorithm is polynomial in n,m,N .
Socially optimal states. A related problem is to consider the complexity of computing a socially
optimal state. Define the social delay of a state x as
γ(x) :=
n∑
j=1
tj(x) · dj(tj(x)). (7)
A socially optimal state is a state x minimizing the social delay γ(x). We remark that, since we are
dealing with congestion games, we are assuming that the delay functions dj associated with each
resource j ∈ {1, . . . , n} are nondecreasing. A delay function dj is called weakly convex if
i · dj(i)− (i− 1) · dj(i− 1) ≤ (i+ 1) · dj(i+ 1)− i · dj(i)
for all 1 < i < N . Weakly convex delay functions have been already studied in the context of
socially optimal states. Werneck et al. [28] consider spanning tree congestion games with such
delay functions and show how to find efficiently a socially optimal solution. Ackermann et al. [1]
extend their algorithm to matroid congestion games with weakly convex delay functions. (See
Section 4 for more details on matroid congestion games). For symmetric TU congestion games,
under the assumption of weakly convex delay functions, the structure of the problem allows us to
use techniques similar to the ones introduced in Theorem 1.
Theorem 2. There exists a strongly polynomial time algorithm for the problem of computing a
socially optimal state of a symmetric TU congestion game with weakly convex delay functions.
Proof. Let (X, d) be a game with N players. By artificially setting dj(0) to be any scalar, we can
rewrite the social delay of a given state x as
γ(x) =
n∑
j=1
tj(x) · dj(tj(x)) =
n∑
j=1
tj(x)∑
i=1
(
i · dj(i)− (i− 1) · dj(i− 1)
)
.
For each resource j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, we define functions d′j : {1, . . . , N} → Z by
d′j(i) := i · dj(i)− (i− 1) · dj(i− 1).
The functions d′j are nondecreasing since the dj are weakly convex, thus we can consider them as
new delay functions. Consider now a new TU congestion game obtained from the original one by
using the new delay functions d′j . By the proof of Theorem 1, we can find in strongly polynomial
time a global minimum of min{φ′(x) : x ∈ X}, where φ′(x) is the potential function of the latter
game. This global minimum is a socially optimal state of the original game since
φ′(x) =
n∑
j=1
tj(x)∑
i=1
d′j(i) = γ(x).
We remark that the weak convexity assumption in Theorem 2 is necessary, since for general
nondecreasing delay functions computing a socially optimal state of a symmetric TU congestion
game is NP-hard [13].
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4 Matroid and polymatroid congestion games
In this section we point out that the aggregation/decomposition algorithm presented in Section 3
can be adapted to independent set matroid congestion games and base matroid congestion games,
where the strategies of each player are, respectively, the independent sets and the bases of a matroid.
We further extend our approach to polymatroid congestion games. We remark that the results
presented in this section hold for both the symmetric and the asymmetric case.
Formally, let Mi = (R, Ii), i = 1, . . . , N , be an indexed family of matroids, and let ri denote
the rank function of Mi. The matroids are all defined on the same ground set R, that is the set of
congestible resources, and |R| = n. In independent set matroid congestion games, Xi consists of
the incidence vectors of the independent sets of Mi, for all i = 1, . . . , N , thus P
i is the independent
set polytope of Mi, defined as
P i = {xi ∈ Rn+ : xi(U) ≤ ri(U) ∀ U ⊆ R}, (8)
see [23]. In base matroid congestion games we restrict to bases, thus P i contains the additional
constraint xi(R) = ri(R).
A polytope in the form (8), where the right-hand-side is given by a submodular, nondecreasing,
normalized function gi : 2
R → Z+, is an integer polymatroid. We assume that gi is given through
a value oracle. Polymatroid congestion games are a generalization of independent set matroid con-
gestion games where the strategies of each player are the integer vectors in an integer polymatroid,
see [9]. In base polymatroid congestion games, for each i = 1, . . . , N , we restrict to vectors such that
xi(R) = gi(R). Note that x
i
j is now a nonnegative integer expressing the usage of resource j by
player i. Thus, the cost of player i in state x is
∑n
j=1 x
i
jdj(tj(x)), where tj(x) is the total usage of
resource j in state x. We refer to [23] for definitions and notions about matroids and polymatroids.
We first define, for any congestion game, a variant of the game where each player keeps only
her maximum cardinality strategies. The next proposition will be useful to reduce base matroid
and polymatroid congestion games to independent set matroid and polymatroid congestion games,
respectively. See the Appendix for a proof.
Proposition 1. Let C be a congestion game with N players, resource set R, and strategy set Xi
for each player i. Let C¯ be another congestion game on R with N players, where the strategy set
X¯i of player i consists only of the maximum cardinality subsets of R in Xi. Given an instance I of
C¯, one can construct in strongly polynomial time an instance h(I) of C such that (i) a pure Nash
equilibrium for h(I) is also a pure Nash equilibrium for I, and (ii) a socially optimal state for h(I)
is also a socially optimal state for I. Moreover, the reduction only modifies the edge delays by a
constant.
It is known that in base matroid congestion games players reach a Nash equilibrium after a
polynomial number of best responses, see Theorem 2.5 in [1]. This immediately implies the next
theorem, in the case of base matroid congestion games.
Theorem 3. There is a strongly polynomial-time algorithm for finding a pure Nash equilibrium in
independent set and base matroid congestion games.
In the Appendix we give an alternative proof of Theorem 3 where we apply a variant of our
aggregation/decomposition algorithm to find a global optimum of (3). This algorithm can be
extended to find a socially optimal state of a (base) polymatroid congestion game, if the delay
functions are weakly convex.
Theorem 4. There is a strongly polynomial time algorithm for the problem of computing a so-
cially optimal state of a polymatroid or base polymatroid congestion game with weakly convex delay
functions.
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Proof. We prove the result for polymatroid congestion games. The statement on base polymatroid
congestion games then follows by adapting Proposition 1 to multisets. The algorithm computes the
global minimum of min{γ(x) : x ∈ X}, where γ(x) is defined as in (7). The aggregated problem is
min

n∑
j=1
γj(zj) : z(U) ≤
N∑
i=1
gi(U) ∀ U ⊆ R, z ∈ Zn+
 , (9)
where, for all j = 1, . . . , n, γj(zj) = zjdj(zj) and zj =
∑N
i=1 x
i
j . Clearly, the polyhedron Q
obtained by replacing z ∈ Zn+ with z ∈ Rn+ in the constraints of (9) defines an integer polymatroid,
since
∑N
i=1 gi is an integer-valued set function that is submodular, nondecreasing and normalized.
Moreover, by assumption, γj(zj) is weakly convex in zj . Since one can minimize a separable weakly
convex function over a polymatroid with the greedy algorithm [8], we can solve the relaxation of
(9) in strongly polynomial time. Moreover, as the right-hand-sides of the constraints in (10) are
integral, the optimal solution z¯ returned by the greedy algorithm is integral.
By Theorem 44.6 and Corollary 46.2c in [23], if z¯ ∈ Q ∩ Zn, then z¯ = x¯1 + · · · + x¯N , where x¯i
is in P i ∩ Zn for i = 1, . . . , N . Moreover, the proof of Corollary 46.2c in [23] provides a strongly
polynomial-time algorithm to find the N incidence vectors x¯1, . . . , x¯N . In each step, one finds an
integer vector xi ∈ P i such that z −∑ik=1 xk is an integer vector in P i+1 + · · ·+ PN . Clearly x¯ is
a socially optimal state.
A corollary of Theorem 4 is the existence of a strongly polynomial time algorithm to find a
socially optimal state of a matroid congestion game with weakly convex delay functions. This
result is stated for base matroid congestion games in Theorem 2.8 of [1], as a generalization of
Theorem 1 in [28]. Since there is a reduction from integer polymatroids to matroids [10], see also
Section 44.6b in [23], one could first reduce a polymatroid congestion game to a matroid congestion
game, and then apply Theorem 2.8 in [1]. However, since for each i, we have to replicate any
element r of the ground set gi(r) times, the algorithm obtained through the reduction would be
exponential in the size of gi(r).
5 Combinatorial TU congestion games
Next, we define five combinatorial congestion games that we will consider in the remainder of the
paper. (See [23] for more details on the corresponding combinatorial problems.)
• Network congestion games (N ). We are given a digraph D = (V,E), with the arcs playing the
role of the resources. For each player i, we are given two nodes ri, si ∈ V , and the strategy set
Xi of player i is the set of all directed paths in D from ri to si.
• Matching congestion games (M) (resp. edge cover congestion games (EC)). We are given a graph
G = (V,E), with the edges playing the role of the resources. For each player i, we are given
a subgraph Gi = (V i, Ei) of G, and the strategy set Xi of player i is the set of all matchings
(resp. edge covers) in Gi.
• Stable set congestion games (SS) (resp. vertex cover congestion games (VC)). We are given a
graph G = (V,E), with the nodes playing the role of the resources. For each player i, we are
given a subgraph Gi = (V i, Ei) of G, and the strategy set Xi of player i is the set of all stable
sets (resp. vertex covers) in Gi.
Proposition 2. Congestion games N , and congestion games M, EC, SS, VC on bipartite graphs
are TU congestion games.
The proof of Proposition 2 is given in the Appendix. Recall that a TU congestion game is
symmetric if Ai = A and bi = b for every player i = 1, . . . , N . As a consequence, games N are
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symmetric if all players have the same origin ri = r and destination si = s. GamesM, EC, SS, VC
are symmetric if all players act on the same subgraph, i.e. Gi = G for all i = 1, . . . , N . Theorem 1
then directly implies the following:
Corollary 1. There is a strongly polynomial-time algorithm for finding a pure Nash equilibrium
in the symmetric case of games N , and of games M, EC, SS, VC on bipartite graphs.
The algorithm given in the proof of Theorem 1 has some nice combinatorial interpretations
for the above combinatorial games. As an example, consider games M. Given bipartite graph
G = (V,E) and delays de, we construct a new bipartite graph G
′ = (V,E′) by replacing each edge
e ∈ E with N parallel edges e1, . . . , eN between the same nodes, with weights −de(1), . . . ,−de(N).
Solving problem (5) is equivalent to finding a maximum weight subset F of E′ such that each node
v in V is incident to at most N edges in F . This is a simple b-matching problem (see Ch. 21 in
[23]). Now let G˜ be the subgraph of G obtained by deleting edge e ∈ E if no edge among e1, . . . , eN
is in F . Moreover, let U be the set of nodes that have degree N in (V, F ). Finding an integer vector
in (6) is then equivalent to finding a matching in the graph G˜ covering all nodes in U . Games EC,
VC, and SS have similar combinatorial interpretations. For the symmetric case of N , we recover
the algorithm described in [7].
We now consider some variants of the combinatorial games previously defined that do not appear
to be TU congestion games. A maximum cardinality matching congestion game (C −M) is a variant
of M where each set Xi consists only of the maximum cardinality matchings in Gi. Similarly, in
a minimum cardinality edge cover congestion game (C − EC) each set Xi consists of the minimum
cardinality edge covers in Gi; in a maximum cardinality stable set congestion game (C − SS) each
set Xi consists of the maximum cardinality stable sets in Gi; in a minimum cardinality vertex cover
congestion game (C − VC) each set Xi consists of the minimum cardinality vertex covers in Gi.
By Proposition 1 and Corollary 1 we obtain the following:
Corollary 2. There is a strongly polynomial-time algorithm for finding a pure Nash equilibrium in
the symmetric case of the following games on bipartite graphs: C −M, C − EC, C − SS, C − VC.
Due to the wide applicability of the original combinatorial problems, also the combinatorial
congestion games defined in this section have a large number of applications. For example, consider
a bipartite graph representing a road network with entry nodes and exit nodes. Each player is an
advertiser, who places her ad on minimum cardinality vertex cover of the graph, which is the
cheapest way to expose each traveler to the ad. In each node, the probability that a traveler sees
a given ad decreases with respect to the total number of ads that have been placed there by all
players. This yields nondecreasing delay functions associated to nodes. Therefore each advertiser
chooses a minimum cardinality vertex cover maximizing the expected number of times that her ad
is seen by the travelers.
5.1 The asymmetric case
In this section we focus on the asymmetric version of the combinatorial congestion games that we
have just introduced. For all such combinatorial games on bipartite graphs, we show that it is
PLS-complete to find pure Nash equilibria, even in the case of linear delay functions, and that it is
NP-hard to find socially optimal states, even in the case of weakly convex delay functions.
We recall that potential games can be regarded as local search problems where the function to
minimize is the potential function (1), and the neighborhood N(x) of a state x ∈ X is the set of
states arising from single player defections, i.e., N(x) = {(x¯i, x−i) : x¯i ∈ Xi \{xi}, i ∈ {1, . . . , N}}.
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PLS-completeness. Informally, a polynomial-time local search (PLS) problem [12] is a local
search problem equipped with a polynomial-time algorithm that, given a solution x, either computes
a better solution in N(x), or determines that no such solution exists, meaning that x is a local
optimum. This yields an algorithm that at each step moves from a solution to an improving
neighboring solution. However this algorithm may still require an exponential number of steps to
converge to a local optimum. A problem Π is PLS-reducible to a problem Π′ if any instance pi of
Π can be mapped in polynomial time to an instance pi′ of Π, and any local optimum of pi′ can be
mapped in polynomial time to a local optimum of pi. A problem in PLS is PLS-complete if every
problem in PLS is PLS-reducible to it. For formal definitions on PLS, we refer to [12, 21].
A well-known PLS-complete problem is POS NAE 2SAT [21], i.e. not-all-equal-2SAT with
positive literals only: an instance consists of clauses in conjunctive normal form; each clause has at
most two positive literals and is assigned a positive value; each clause is satisfied if its constituents
do not all have the same value. A solution is a truth assignment, i.e. a 0/1 assignment to all
variables; the value of a solution, to be maximized, is the sum of the values of the satisfied clauses;
the neighborhood of a solution contains all solutions obtained by flipping the value of one variable.
The local search problem is to find a truth assignment whose value cannot be increased by flipping
a variable.
We remark that asymmetric TU congestion games in the form (2) are PLS-complete, even if
A = Ai, i = 1, . . . , N , and even in case of linear delay functions. This follows directly from the PLS-
completeness of asymmetric N with linear delay functions [1] (see also [7]) and from the proof of
Proposition 2. Note that all the asymmetric variants of problemsM, EC, SS and VC on bipartite
graphs can be written as TU congestion games with A = Ai, for i = 1, . . . , N . Our goal is to prove
that all these asymmetric TU congestion games are PLS-complete.
To this purpose we define the perfect matching congestion game (PM) as a variant ofM where
for every player i, the subgraph Gi admits a perfect matching, and where the set Xi consists only
of the perfect matchings in Gi. An instance of PM is an instance of C −M and of C − EC where
all subgraphs Gi admit a perfect matching. Similarly, the perfect vertex cover congestion game
(PVC) is a variant of VC where for every player i, the subgraph Gi admits a perfect vertex cover,
i.e., a vertex cover that is also a stable set, and where the set Xi consists only of the perfect vertex
covers in Gi. An instance of PVC is an instance of C − VC and of C − SS where all subgraphs Gi
admit a perfect vertex cover.
Theorem 5. It is PLS-complete to find a pure Nash equilibrium in the asymmetric versions of
PM, M, EC, on bipartite graphs and even in the case of linear delay functions.
Proof. (i) We give a PLS-reduction of POS NAE 2SAT to an asymmetric PM on a bipartite graph
G. First, we define a map h from any instance of POS NAE 2SAT to an instance of an asymmetric
PM on a bipartite graph G. Given an instance I of POS NAE 2SAT, we construct a congestion
game h(I) as follows. Denote by C = {c1, . . . , cn} the clauses of I and by {x1, . . . , xN} its variables.
Let wj be the value of clause cj and, for a truth assignment x of I denote by w(x) the value of x.
Each variable of POS NAE 2SAT is a player of the PM and each NAE clause is a set of resources,
i.e. a set of edges. Precisely, for each NAE clause cj we build the graph “gadget” in Fig. 1(i). The
graph gadget of clause cj is a 4-cycle uj , vj , zj , v¯j , uj .
Let mj ∈ {1, 2} denote the number of variables in cj . The edge delays are defined as follows:
• If e = v¯juj or e = v¯jzj , then de(i) = 0 for i = 1, . . . , N ;
• If e = vjuj and cj contains at least a constant equal to 1, then de(i) = 0 for i = 1, . . . , N ;
otherwise, de(i) = wj for i = 1, . . . , N if mj = 1, and de(i) = wj(i− 1) if mj = 2;
• If e = vjzj and cj contains at least a constant equal to 0, then de(i) = 0 for i = 1, . . . , N ;
otherwise, de(i) = wj for i = 1, . . . , N if mj = 1, and de(i) = wj(i− 1) if mj = 2.
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Now, we build graph G as follows: for any two clauses cj and cj+1, j = 1, . . . , n − 1 we identify
zj and uj+1; moreover, we identify zn and u1, see Fig. 1(ii). Clearly, G is a bipartite graph with
bipartitions {vj , v¯j}j=1,...,n and {uj}j=1,...,n. For each i = 1, . . . , N , let C(i) denote the set of clauses
containing variable xi and let Vi = {uj , zj : j = 1, . . . , n} ∪ {vj : cj ∈ C(i)} ∪ {v¯j : cj /∈ C(i)}. We
assign to player i the subgraph Gi of G induced by nodes in Vi. This shows how to map I to an
instance h(I) of asymmetric PM on a bipartite graph.
Next, we define a map g from states of h(I) to truth assignments of I. A state of h(I) is a
set of N perfect matchings on graphs Gi, i = 1, . . . , N . Note that each subgraph Gi is a cycle of
length 2n that admits two perfect matchings: M i0 = {ujvj : cj ∈ C(i)} ∪ {uj v¯j : cj /∈ C(i)} and
M i1 = {vjzj : cj ∈ C(i)} ∪ {v¯jzj : cj /∈ C(i)}. Let gi : {M i0,M i1} → {0, 1} such that gi(M i0) = 0 and
gi(M
i
1) = 1. We map strategy M
i ∈ {M i0,M i1} of player i to xi = gi(M i). Setting g = (g1, . . . , gN )
shows that any state of h(I) is mapped to a truth assignment of I, and that the mapping is bijective.
Finally, we need to show that any pure Nash equilibrium of h(I) maps to a local optimum of
I. First, we remark that, for any truth assignment x of I, each x′ ∈ N(x) obtained by flipping
variable xi, i ∈ {1, . . . , N} is in one-to-one correspondence with the state obtained from g−1(x)
after the defection of player i. Now, let M1, . . . ,MN be a pure Nash equilibrium of h(I), where
M i ∈ {M i0,M i1} for all i = 1, . . . , N , and denote by y the corresponding state. Then, for any state
y′ obtained from y by switching perfect matching M i, we have that fi(y′) − fi(y) ≥ 0, where fi
denotes the cost of player i in PM. By construction, for x = g(y) and x′ = g(y′) we have that
w(x)− w(x′) = fi(y′)− fi(y) ≥ 0. This proves that x is a local optimum of I.
(ii) Since PM is equivalent to C −M when all subgraphs Gi admit a perfect matching, (i)
implies that asymmetric C −M is PLS-complete on a bipartite graph. The result then follows by
Proposition 1.
(iii) Since PM is equivalent to C − EC when all subgraphs Gi admit a perfect matching, (i)
implies that asymmetric C − EC is PLS-complete on a bipartite graph. The result then follows by
Proposition 1.
We can show analogous result for the asymmetric PVC, VC, and SS on a bipartite graph, see
the Appendix for a proof.
Theorem 6. It is PLS-complete to find a pure Nash equilibrium in the asymmetric versions of
PVC, VC, SS, on bipartite graphs and even in the case of linear delay functions.
NP-hardness. Computing a socially optimal state for asymmetric TU congestion games is NP-
hard, even if A = Ai, i = 1, . . . , N . This follows from the NP-hardness of asymmetric N [13]. The
next two theorems show that finding socially optimal states in the combinatorial games that we
have introduced is NP-hard. The proof of Theorem 7 is given in the Appendix, and is based on a
reduction similar to the one given in the proof of Theorem 5.
Theorem 7. It is NP-hard to find a socially optimal state in the asymmetric versions of PM, M,
EC, on bipartite graphs and even in the case of weakly convex delay functions.
Theorem 8. It is NP-hard to find a socially optimal state in the asymmetric versions of PVC, VC,
SS, on bipartite graphs and even in the case of weakly convex delay functions.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. (i) Let I be an instance of C¯. Let d¯j(i), i = 1, . . . , N , be the given delays
in I, and let ∆ := max{|d¯j(i)| : j ∈ R, i = 1, . . . , N}. We set the delays in h(I) to be dj(i) =
d¯j(i) − (2|R|∆ + 1). It can be checked that for every player i, the cost in h(I) corresponding to
a strategy that is of maximum cardinality will always be strictly smaller than the cost in h(I)
corresponding to a strategy that is not of maximum cardinality.
We show that a pure Nash equilibrium x for h(I) is also a pure Nash equilibrium for I. The
strategy of each player i in x is of maximum cardinality, thus x is also a state of I. The cost f i(x)
of player i in h(I) is f i(x) = f¯ i(x)−ki(2|R|∆+1), where f¯ i(x) is the cost of player i in I, and ki is
the cardinality of a maximum cardinality strategy of player i. By contradiction, assume that there
is another strategy x˜i for player i in I such that in the state x˜ obtained from x by swapping xi with
x˜i, player i has lower cost in I, i.e., f¯ i(x˜) < f¯ i(x). Clearly x˜i is a another maximum cardinality
strategy. This implies f i(x˜) = f¯ i(x˜)−ki(2|R|∆+1) < f¯ i(x)−ki(2|R|∆+1) = f i(x), contradicting
the fact that x is a pure Nash equilibrium for h(I).
(ii) Let I be an instance of C¯. Let d¯j(i), i = 1, . . . , N , be the given delays in I, and let ∆ :=
max{|d¯j(i)| : j ∈ R, i = 1, . . . , N}. We set the delays in h(I) to be dj(i) = C¯j(i)− (2N |R|∆ + 1).
It can be checked that the social delay in h(I) corresponding to a state where each strategy is of
maximum cardinality will always be strictly smaller than the social delay in h(I) corresponding to
a state where at least one strategy is not of maximum cardinality.
We show that a socially optimal state x for h(I) is also a socially optimal state for I. The
strategy of each player i in x is of maximum cardinality, thus x is also a state of I. The social
delay γ(x) of x in h(I) is γ(x) = γ¯(x)− (∑nj=1 tj(x))(2N |R|∆ + 1), where γ¯(x) is the social delay
of x in I. By contradiction, assume that there is another state x˜ with lower social delay, i.e.,
γ¯(x˜) < γ¯(x). Clearly x˜ is a state where the strategy of each player is of maximum cardinality, thus∑n
j=1 tj(x˜) =
∑n
j=1 tj(x). This implies
γ(x˜) = γ¯(x˜)− (
n∑
j=1
tj(x˜))(2N |R|∆ + 1) < γ¯(x)− (
n∑
j=1
tj(x))(2N |R|∆ + 1) = γ(x),
contradicting the fact that x is a socially optimal state for h(I).
Note that both the given reductions are strongly polynomial.
Proof of Proposition 2. Network congestion games are TU congestion games, since xi is the inci-
dence vector of a dipath from ri to si in digraph D = (V,E) if and only if Axi = bi, xi ∈ {0, 1}E ,
where A is the V × E incidence matrix of D, and bi has entry −1 corresponding to node ri, entry
+1 corresponding to node si, and all other entries are 0.
M and EC on bipartite graphs are TU congestion games, since xi is the incidence vector of a
matching (resp. edge cover) in Gi = (V i, Ei) if and only if Aixi ≤ 1 (resp. Aixi ≥ 1), xi ∈ {0, 1}Ei ,
where Ai is the V i × Ei incidence matrix of Gi.
SS and VC on bipartite graphs are TU congestion games, since xi is the incidence vector of a
stable set (resp. vertex cover) in Gi = (V i, Ei) if and only if Aixi ≤ 1 (resp. Axi ≥ 1), xi ∈ {0, 1}Vi ,
where Ai is the Ei × V i incidence matrix of Gi.
Proof of Theorem 3. We first consider independent set matroid congestion games. Again, the al-
gorithm computes the global optimum of (3). The aggregated problem (4) becomes
min

n∑
j=1
φj(zj) : z(U) ≤
N∑
i=1
ri(U) ∀ U ⊆ R, z ∈ Zn+
 , (10)
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where, for all j = 1, . . . , n, φj(zj) =
∑zj
i=1 dj(i). Note that φj(zj) is weakly convex in zj , since dj(i)
is nondecreasing in i. Moreover, the polyhedron Q obtained by replacing z ∈ Zn+ with z ∈ Rn+ in the
constraints of (10) defines an integer polymatroid, since
∑N
i=1 ri is an integer-valued set function
that is submodular, nondecreasing and normalized.
Since one can minimize a separable weakly convex function over a polymatroid with the greedy
algorithm [8], we can solve the relaxation of (10) in strongly polynomial time. Moreover, as the
right-hand-sides of the constraints in (10) are integral, the optimal solution z¯ returned by the greedy
algorithm is integral.
It is known that the independent set polytope of a matroid has the integer decomposition
property (see [23], Corollary 42.1e), and this property can also be generalized to the asymmetric
case. In fact, if z¯ ∈ Q ∩ Zn, then z¯ = x¯1 + · · · + x¯N , where x¯i is in P i ∩ Zn for i = 1, . . . , N , see
Theorem 44.6 and Corollary 46.2c in [23]. Moreover, the proof of Corollary 46.2c in [23] provides
a polynomial-time algorithm to find the N incidence vectors x¯1, . . . , x¯N . Alternatively, one could
apply Edmond’s matroid union algorithm [6]. Clearly x¯ is a pure Nash equilibrium.
The statement on base matroid congestion games follows directly from Proposition 1.
Proof of Theorem 6. (i) We give a PLS-reduction of POS NAE 2SAT to an asymmetric PVC on a
bipartite graph G. The proof structure is similar to that of Theorem 5, thus here we only outline
the main differences. Again, the variables of POS NAE 2SAT map to players of PVC and clauses
map to a set of resources. For each NAE clause cj we build the graph “gadget” in Fig. 2(i), that
is a 8-cycle uj , sj , vj , tj , zj , t¯j , v¯j , s¯j , uj .
For mj ∈ {1, 2} the vertex delays are defined as:
• If u /∈ {sj , vj}, then du(i) = 0 for i = 1, . . . , N ;
• If u = sj and cj contains at least a constant equal to 1, then du(i) = 0 for i = 1, . . . , N ;
otherwise, de(i) = wj for i = 1, . . . , N if mj = 1, and de(i) = wj(i− 1) if mj = 2;
• If u = vj and cj contains at least a constant equal to 0, then du(i) = 0 for i = 1, . . . , N ;
otherwise, de(i) = wj for i = 1, . . . , N if mj = 1, and de(i) = wj(i− 1) if mj = 2.
We build a bipartite graph G by identifying zn and u1 and zj and uj+1 for j = 1, . . . , n − 1,
see Fig. 2(ii). For each i = 1, . . . , N , we let Vi = {uj , zj : j = 1, . . . , n} ∪ {sj , vj , tj : cj ∈
C(i)} ∪ {s¯j , v¯j , t¯j : cj /∈ C(i)} and we define Gi as the subgraph of G induced by nodes in Vi.
Since each Gi is a cycle of length 4n, it admits exactly two perfect vertex covers: W
i
0 = {sj , tj :
cj ∈ C(i)} ∪ {s¯j , t¯j : cj /∈ C(i)} and W i1 = {uj , vj : cj ∈ C(i)} ∪ {uj , v¯j : cj /∈ C(i)}. We define
gi : {W i0,W i1} → {0, 1} such that gi(W i0) = 0 and gi(W i1) = 1 and we map strategy W i ∈ {W i0,W i1}
of player i to xi = gi(W
i).
Let y be a Nash equilibrium of PVC corresponding to vertex covers W 1, . . . ,WN , and denote
by fi the cost function of player i. Then, for any state y
′ obtained by switching perfect vertex cover
W i, we have that fi(y
′) − fi(y) ≥ 0. By construction, for x = g(y) and x′ = g(y′) it follows that
w(x)− w(x′) = fi(y′)− fi(y) ≥ 0.
(ii) Since PVC is equivalent to C − VC when all subgraphs Gi admit a perfect vertex cover, (i)
implies that asymmetric C − VC is PLS-complete on a bipartite graph. The result then follows by
Proposition 1.
(iii) Since PVC is equivalent to C − SS when all subgraphs Gi admit a perfect vertex cover, (i)
implies that asymmetric C − SS is PLS-complete on a bipartite graph. The result then follows by
Proposition 1.
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Proof of Theorem 7. (i) We give a polynomial reduction of POS NAE 3SAT to an asymmetric PM
on a bipartite graph G. POS NAE 3SAT is a NP-complete variant of NAE 3SAT in the absence
of negated variables (see [20]).
First, we define a map h from any instance of POS NAE 3SAT to an instance of an asymmetric
PM on a bipartite graph G. Given an instance I of POS NAE 3SAT, we construct a congestion
game h(I) as follows. Denote by C = {c1, . . . , cn} the clauses of I and by {x1, . . . , xN} its variables.
Each variable of POS NAE 3SAT is a player of the PM and each NAE clause is a set of resources,
i.e. a set of edges. Precisely, for each NAE clause cj we build the graph “gadget” in Fig. 1(i). The
graph gadget of clause cj is a 4-cycle uj , vj , zj , v¯j , uj .
The weakly convex edge delays are defined as follows:
• If e = v¯juj or e = v¯jzj , then de(i) = 0 for i = 1, . . . , N ;
• If e = vjuj or e = vjzj , then de(1) = 0, and de(i) = i− 2 for i = 2, . . . , N .
Following the proof of Theorem 5, we map I to an instance h(I) of asymmetric PM on a
bipartite graph G, and we define a map g from states of h(I) to truth assignments of I.
Finally, we need to show that a state of h(I) has social delay equal to zero if and only if it
maps to a truth assignment I that satisfies the POS NAE 3SAT formula. Let M1, . . . ,MN be a
state of h(I), where M i ∈ {M i0,M i1} for all i = 1, . . . , N . Then h(I) has social delay equal to zero
if and only if for every clause cj there are at most two players i ∈ {1, . . . , N} with vjuj ∈M i, and
at most two players i ∈ {1, . . . , N} with vjzj ∈ M i. This happens if and only if for every clause
cj there are at most two variables xi contained in the clause and with value zero, and there are at
most two variables xi contained in the clause and with value one. Clearly, this happens if and only
if I satisfies the POS NAE 3SAT formula.
(ii) Since PM is equivalent to C −M when all subgraphs Gi admit a perfect matching, (i)
implies that asymmetric C −M is NP-hard on a bipartite graph. Since modifying delay functions
by a constant maintains weak convexity, the result then follows by Proposition 1.
(iii) Since PM is equivalent to C − EC when all subgraphs Gi admit a perfect matching, (i)
implies that asymmetric C − EC is NP-hard on a bipartite graph. Since modifying delay functions
by a constant maintains weak convexity, the result then follows by Proposition 1.
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Figure 1: Reduction from POS NAE 2SAT to asymmetric PM on a bipartite graph.
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Figure 2: Reduction from POS NAE 2SAT to asymmetric PVC on a bipartite graph.
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